Indicative · based on ADS-B integrity (NIC) data
Tel Aviv FIR (LLLL)
Positioning anomaly2026-10-15 10:23Z – 10:24Z · 1 h
- Positioning anomaly
- Rule: high
- Aircraft reporting the jump
- 1
The event is built for a single aircraft; it is not a count of affected aircraft.
Positioning anomaly: an aircraft's reported position jumps an impossible distance in a short time. The rule level is not integrity drop observation sufficiency; it does not confirm physical spoofing.
Rule level does not mean the same as integrity drop observation sufficiency. This classification does not prove physical spoofing; it indicates anomalous positioning behavior.
Opens the event's day; you choose departure and arrival.
Evidence
- Rule basis
- Several aircraft reported jumps at the same place and time.4 different aircraft jumped at nearby positions within a short time.
- Position jumps
- 1
- Largest jump
- 70 nm
- Post-jump position
- 33 aircraft reported positions in the immediate vicinity of this location between 10:19:09 and 10:29:09 UTC.3 of these aircraft also showed positioning jumps flagged by the rule.31.7171° N, 35.9993° E
- Pre-jump position
- 1 aircraft reported positions in the immediate vicinity of this location between 10:18:28 and 10:28:28 UTC.1 of these aircraft also showed positioning jumps flagged by the rule.32.012° N, 34.6795° E
- FIR
- Tel Aviv FIR (LLLL), Amman FIR (OJAC)
Count of unique aircraft reporting positions in the immediate vicinity of this location during the displayed window. This measurement does not state a cause.
Technical details
- Cells
- 2
- Data source
- adsb.lol (ODbL)
- Algorithm version
- 1.6.0
Shared position-anomaly group
This event is in the same group as other aircraft that reported a position anomaly close by, at about the same time.
- Distinct aircraft in the group
- 4
- Group duration
- 4 min
- Events in the group
- 4
- Group robustness
- RobustShows whether the group also forms when the method settings change slightly. A “setting-sensitive” group depends on those settings and should be read with more caution.
These aircraft recently reported a nearby position; this does not mean they share the same cause. A group is a relation built between events; it is not an event itself and is an informational indicator of a pattern consistent with GNSS degradation. Group identifiers are not permanent: they are recomputed as data is updated and can change. Groups are built only from aircraft our data source sees; in regions with weak receiver coverage, the absence of a group does not mean there is no anomaly there.
What we do not know about this event
- Cause: jamming, spoofing or a fault in the aircraft's avionics cannot be told apart from this data alone.
- Coverage: the data comes from a single source (adsb.lol); aircraft where there are no receivers are not seen.
- Single aircraft: the event rests on one aircraft's positioning behaviour; a common pattern in the area cannot be read from this data.
- Reality: this is an indicator; the event has not been verified by an independent source.
Method and limits
- What is this event?
- Position jumps rely on an aircraft's reported position jumping an impossible distance in a short time. The classification is rule-based and has not been independently validated; it does not establish physical spoofing.
- What does observation sufficiency say?
- The rule level is a rule-based classification and does not mean the same as integrity drop observation sufficiency. Higher levels mean the rule detected a stronger indication; the “Rule basis” row (when present) says which indication the level rests on. The event is still built for a single aircraft; a common position pattern cannot be read from this data. The classification does not prove physical spoofing; it indicates anomalous positioning behavior. A receiver or data fault can leave the same trace.
Indicative · based on ADS-B integrity (NIC) data · Contains information from adsb.lol contributors (ODbL 1.0) · Manzlytics GNSS