Indicative · based on ADS-B integrity (NIC) data
Budapest FIR (LHCC)
Positioning anomaly2026-10-22 21:08Z – 21:15Z · 1 h
- Positioning anomaly
- Rule: medium
- Aircraft reporting the jump
- 1
The event is built for a single aircraft; it is not a count of affected aircraft.
Positioning anomaly: an aircraft's reported position jumps an impossible distance in a short time. The rule level is not integrity drop observation sufficiency; it does not confirm physical spoofing.
Rule level does not mean the same as integrity drop observation sufficiency. This classification does not prove physical spoofing; it indicates anomalous positioning behavior.
Opens the event's day; you choose departure and arrival.
Evidence
- Rule basis
- One aircraft, repeated jumps; position integrity (NIC) reported high.
- Ground measurement (MLAT) comparison
- In 0 of 1 matches the reported position was clearly far from the ground measurementMLAT: a position computed by ground receivers from signal time-of-arrival differences, independent of the aircraft's GNSS. It has its own errors; it is an additional observation, not proof on its own.
- Position jumps
- 2
- Largest jump
- 109 nm
- Post-jump position
- 1 aircraft reported positions in the immediate vicinity of this location between 21:03:55 and 21:13:55 UTC.1 of these aircraft also showed positioning jumps flagged by the rule.49.0128° N, 24.3502° E
- Pre-jump position
- 1 aircraft reported positions in the immediate vicinity of this location between 21:03:41 and 21:13:41 UTC.1 of these aircraft also showed positioning jumps flagged by the rule.47.9874° N, 22.4971° E
- FIR
- Budapest FIR (LHCC), Bratislava FIR (LZBB), Lvov FIR (UKLV)
Count of unique aircraft reporting positions in the immediate vicinity of this location during the displayed window. This measurement does not state a cause.
Technical details
- Cells
- 3
- Data source
- adsb.lol (ODbL)
- Algorithm version
- 1.10.0
What we do not know about this event
- Cause: jamming, spoofing or a fault in the aircraft's avionics cannot be told apart from this data alone.
- Coverage: the data comes from a single source (adsb.lol); aircraft where there are no receivers are not seen.
- Single aircraft: the event rests on one aircraft's positioning behaviour; a common pattern in the area cannot be read from this data.
- Reality: this is an indicator; the event has not been verified by an independent source.
Method and limits
- What is this event?
- Position jumps rely on an aircraft's reported position jumping an impossible distance in a short time. The classification is rule-based and has not been independently validated; it does not establish physical spoofing.
- What does observation sufficiency say?
- The rule level is a rule-based classification and does not mean the same as integrity drop observation sufficiency. Higher levels mean the rule detected a stronger indication; the “Rule basis” row (when present) says which indication the level rests on. The event is still built for a single aircraft; a common position pattern cannot be read from this data. The classification does not prove physical spoofing; it indicates anomalous positioning behavior. A receiver or data fault can leave the same trace.
Indicative · based on ADS-B integrity (NIC) data · Contains information from adsb.lol contributors (ODbL 1.0) · Manzlytics GNSS