Indicative · based on ADS-B integrity (NIC) data
Budapest FIR (LHCC)
Positioning anomaly2026-10-21 13:43Z – 13:43Z · 1 h
- Positioning anomaly
- Rule: high
- Aircraft reporting the jump
- 1
The event is built for a single aircraft; it is not a count of affected aircraft.
Positioning anomaly: an aircraft's reported position jumps an impossible distance in a short time. The rule level is not integrity drop observation sufficiency; it does not confirm physical spoofing.
Rule level does not mean the same as integrity drop observation sufficiency. This classification does not prove physical spoofing; it indicates anomalous positioning behavior.
Opens the event's day; you choose departure and arrival.
Evidence
- Rule basis
- Several aircraft reported jumps at the same place and time.3 different aircraft jumped at nearby positions within a short time.
- Ground measurement (MLAT) comparison
- No ground measurement (MLAT) for this event; it could not be compared.MLAT: a position computed by ground receivers from signal time-of-arrival differences, independent of the aircraft's GNSS. It has its own errors; it is an additional observation, not proof on its own.
- Position jumps
- 1
- Largest jump
- 16 nm
- Post-jump position
- 2 aircraft reported positions in the immediate vicinity of this location between 13:38:41 and 13:48:41 UTC.1 of these aircraft also showed positioning jumps flagged by the rule.47.1275° N, 20.0573° E
- Pre-jump position
- 2 aircraft reported positions in the immediate vicinity of this location between 13:38:22 and 13:48:22 UTC.1 of these aircraft also showed positioning jumps flagged by the rule.47.2949° N, 19.7642° E
- FIR
- Budapest FIR (LHCC)
Count of unique aircraft reporting positions in the immediate vicinity of this location during the displayed window. This measurement does not state a cause.
Technical details
- Cells
- 2
- Data source
- adsb.lol (ODbL)
- Algorithm version
- 1.10.0
What we do not know about this event
- Cause: jamming, spoofing or a fault in the aircraft's avionics cannot be told apart from this data alone.
- Coverage: the data comes from a single source (adsb.lol); aircraft where there are no receivers are not seen.
- Single aircraft: the event rests on one aircraft's positioning behaviour; a common pattern in the area cannot be read from this data.
- Reality: this is an indicator; the event has not been verified by an independent source.
Method and limits
- What is this event?
- Position jumps rely on an aircraft's reported position jumping an impossible distance in a short time. The classification is rule-based and has not been independently validated; it does not establish physical spoofing.
- What does observation sufficiency say?
- The rule level is a rule-based classification and does not mean the same as integrity drop observation sufficiency. Higher levels mean the rule detected a stronger indication; the “Rule basis” row (when present) says which indication the level rests on. The event is still built for a single aircraft; a common position pattern cannot be read from this data. The classification does not prove physical spoofing; it indicates anomalous positioning behavior. A receiver or data fault can leave the same trace.
Indicative · based on ADS-B integrity (NIC) data · Contains information from adsb.lol contributors (ODbL 1.0) · Manzlytics GNSS